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Abstract
Federated learning systems enable the collaborative
training of machine learning models among different
organizations under the privacy restrictions. As re-
searchers try to support more machine learning mod-
els with different privacy-preserving approaches,
current federated learning systems face challenges
from various issues such as unpractical system as-
sumptions, scalability and efficiency. Inspired by
federated systems in other fields such as databases
and cloud computing, we investigate the character-
istics of federated learning systems. We find that
two important features for other federated systems,
i.e., heterogeneity and autonomy, are rarely con-
sidered in the existing federated learning systems.
Moreover, we provide a thorough categorization for
federated learning systems according to four differ-
ent aspects, including data partition, model, privacy
level, and communication architecture. Lastly, we
take a systematic comparison among the existing
federated learning systems and present future re-
search opportunities and directions.
1 Introduction
Many machine learning algorithms are data hungry, and in
reality, data are dispersed over different organizations under
the protection of privacy restrictions. Due to these factors,
federated learning (FL) [Shi et al., 2017] has become a hot
research topic in machine learning and data mining. For ex-
ample, the patient records in different hospitals of different
regions may be quite different and become “data islands”.
Since the size or the characteristic of data in each data island
has limitations, a single hospital may not be able to train a high
quality model that has a good performance for a specific task.
Ideally, hospitals can benefit more if they can collaboratively
train a machine learning model with the union of their data.
However, the data cannot simply be shared among the hospi-
tals due to various policies and regulations. Such phenomena
on “data islands” are commonly seen in many other areas such
as finance, government, and supply chains. Policies such as
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [Albrecht, 2016]
stipulate rules on data sharing among different organizations.
Thus, it is challenging to develop a federated learning system
which has a good performance while protecting data privacy.
Many efforts have been devoted to implementing federated
learning systems (FLSs) to support effective machine learning
algorithms. For instance, Nikolaenko et al. [2013] and Chen
et al. [2018] proposed approaches to conduct FL based on
linear regression. Hardy et al. [2017] implemented an FL
framework to train a logistic regression model. Since gradient
boosting decision trees (GBDTs) have become very successful
in recent years [Chen and Guestrin, 2016; Wen et al., 2019],
the corresponding FLSs have also been proposed by Zhao
et al. [2018] and Cheng et al. [2019]. Moreover, there are
also many neural network based FLSs. Google has proposed
a scalable production system which enables tens of millions
of devices to train a deep neural network [Bonawitz et al.,
2019]. Shokri and Shmatikov [2015] also proposed a privacy-
preserving framework to train neural networks.
Among the studies on customizing machine learning algo-
rithms under the federated context, we have identified a few
common building methods. One common method is to use
secure multi-party computation which can be enabled with
cryptographic techniques [Bonawitz et al., 2017] such as se-
cure aggregation and homomorphic encryption. The other
popular method is differential privacy [Zhao et al., 2018],
which adds noises to the model parameters to protect the in-
dividual record. Google’s system [Bonawitz et al., 2017]
adopts both secure aggregation and differential privacy to en-
hance privacy guarantees, while other studies [Liu et al., 2018;
Nikolaenko et al., 2013] use homomorphic encryption to pro-
tect user privacy.
Several methods try to combine FL with other machine
learning techniques such as multi-task learning and transfer
learning. Smith et al. [2017] combined FL with multi-task
learning to allow multiple participants to complete separate
tasks. To address the scenario where the label information only
exists in one participant, Yang et al. [2019] adopted transfer
learning to collaboratively learn a model.
In this paper, we take a survey on the existing FLSs with
a focus on drawing the analogy and differences to traditional
federated systems in other fields such as databases [Sheth and
Larson, 1990] and cloud computing [Kurze et al., 2011]. First,
we consider heterogeneity and autonomy as two important
characteristics of FLSs, which are often ignored in the ex-
isting designs in federated learning. Second, we categorize
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FLSs based on four different aspects: data distribution, model,
privacy level, and communication architecture. Furthermore,
based on these aspects, we compare the existing FLSs and
discover the key limitations of them. Last, to make FL more
practical and powerful, we present research directions to work
on in the future.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. (1)
By analogy with the previous federated systems, we analyze
two dimensions, including heterogeneity and autonomy, of
federated learning systems. These dimensions can play an im-
portant role in the design of FLSs. (2) We provide a complete
taxonomy against federated learning systems on four different
aspects, including data distribution, model, privacy level, and
communication architecture, which can be used to compare
existing FLSs and direct future research of FLSs.
2 Federated Systems
In this section, we review key conventional federated systems
and present the federated learning systems.
2.1 Conventional Federated Systems
The concept of federation can be found with its counterparts
in the real world. For example, the United States is a feder-
ation of 50 self-governing states. The main characteristic of
federation is cooperation. From society to computing, feder-
ated computing systems have always been an attractive area in
computer science.
Around 1990, there were many studies on federated
database systems (FDBSs) [Sheth and Larson, 1990]. A feder-
ated database system is a collection of autonomous databases
cooperating for mutual benefit. As pointed out in a previous
study [Sheth and Larson, 1990], three important components
of an FDBS are autonomy, heterogeneity, and distribution.
First, a database system (DBS) that participates in an FDBS
is autonomous, which means it is under separate and inde-
pendent control. They can still manage the data without the
FDBS. Second, differences in hardware, system software, and
communication systems are allowed in an FDBS. A powerful
FDBS can run in heterogeneous hardware or software envi-
ronments. Last, due to the existence of multiple DBSs before
an FDBS is built, the data distribution may differ in different
DBSs. An FDBS can benefit from the data distribution if de-
signed properly. Generally, FDBSs focus on the management
of distributed data.
More recently, with the development of cloud computing,
many studies have been done for federated cloud comput-
ing [Kurze et al., 2011]. A federated cloud (FC) is the deploy-
ment and management of multiple external and internal cloud
computing services. The concept of cloud federation enables
further reduction of costs due to partial outsourcing to more
cost-efficient regions. Resource migration and resource redun-
dancy are two basic features of federated cloud [Kurze et al.,
2011]. First, data respectively resources may be transferred
from one cloud provider to another. Migration enables the re-
location of resources. Second, redundancy allows concurrent
usage of similar service features in different domains. For ex-
ample, the data can be broken down and processed at different
providers following the same computation logic. Overall, the
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Figure 1: Federated database, federated cloud, and federated learning
scheduling of different resources is a key factor in the design
of a federated cloud system.
2.2 Federated Learning Systems
While machine learning, especially deep learning, has attracted
many attentions again recently, the combination of federa-
tion and machine learning becomes quite important. When
it comes to federated learning, the goal is to conduct collab-
orative machine learning techniques among different organi-
zations under the restrictions on user privacy. Here we give a
formal definition of federated learning systems.
We assume that there are N different participants, and each
participant is denoted by Ti, where i ∈ [1, N ]. We use Di
to denote the data of Ti. For the non-federated setting, each
participant Ti uses only its local data Di to train a machine
learning model Mi. The performance of Mi is denoted as Pi.
In a federated learning system, all the participants jointly train
a model Mf while each participant Ti protects its data Di
according to its specific privacy restrictions. The performance
of Mf is denoted as Pf . Then, for a valid federated learning
system, there exists i ∈ [1, N ] such that Pf > Pi.
Note that, in the above definition, we only require that there
exists any participant that can gain from the FLS. Even though
some participants cannot gain from an FLS, they may make
an agreement with the other participants to ask for rewards or
participate in other FLSs where they can benefit.
2.3 Analogy Among Federated Systems
Figure 1 shows the frameworks of federated database systems,
federated cloud, and federated learning systems. There are
some similarities and differences between federated learning
systems and conventional federated systems. On the one hand,
the concept of federation still applies. The common and basic
idea is about the cooperation of multiple independent organiza-
tions. Therefore, the perspective of considering heterogeneity
and autonomy among the participants can still be applied in
FLSs. Furthermore, some factors in the design of distributed
systems are still important for FLSs. For example, how the
data are communicated between the participants can influence
the efficiency of the systems. On the other hand, these fed-
erated systems have different main concerns. While FDBSs
focus on the management of distributed data and FCs focus
on the scheduling of the resources, FLSs care more about the
secure computation among multiple participants. FLSs induce
new challenges such as the algorithm designs of the distributed
training and the data protection under the privacy restrictions.
With these findings, we analyze the existing FLSs and figure
out the potential future directions of FLSs in the following
sections.
3 Characteristics
While existing FLSs take a lot of concerns on user privacy
and machine learning models, heterogeneity and autonomy,
which are two important characteristics of previous federated
systems, are rarely addressed.
3.1 Heterogeneity
We consider heterogeneities between different organizations
in three aspects: data, privacy requirements and tasks.
Differences in data
Organizations always have different data distributions. For
example, due to the ozone hole, the countries in the South-
ern Hemisphere may have more skin cancer patients than the
Northern Hemisphere. Thus, hospitals in different countries
tend to have very different distributions of patients records.
The difference in data distributions may be a very important
factor in the design of FLSs. The organizations can potentially
gain a lot from FL if the participants have various and partially
representative distributions towards a specific task. Further-
more, if organization Alice has fully representative data for
task A and organization Bob also has fully representative data
for task B, Alice and Bob can make a deal to conduct FLs for
both task A and B to improve the performance for task B and
task A, respectively.
Besides data distributions, the size of data may also differ
in different organizations. FL should enable collaboration
between organizations with different scales. Furthermore,
for fairness, the organizations that provide more data should
benefit more from FL.
Differences in privacy restrictions
Different organizations always have different policies and
regulation of data sharing restriction. For example, the com-
panies in the EU have to comply with the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) [Albrecht, 2016], while China
recently issued a new regulation namely the Personal In-
formation Security Specification (PISS). Furthermore, even
in the same region, different organizations still have differ-
ent detailed privacy rules. The privacy restrictions play an
important role in the design of FLSs. Generally, the or-
ganizations are able to gain more from FL if the privacy
restrictions are looser. Many works assume that the orga-
nizations have the same privacy level [Chen et al., 2018;
Cheng et al., 2019]. The scenario where the organizations
have different privacy restrictions is more complicated and
meaningful. It is very challenging to design an FLS which
can maximize the utilization of data of each party while not
violating their respective privacy restrictions.
Differences in tasks
The tasks of different organizations may also vary. A bank
may want to know whether a person can repay the loan but
an insurance company may want to know whether the person
will buy their products. The bank and the insurance bank can
also adopt FL although they want to perform different tasks.
Multiple machine learning models may be learned during the
FL process. Techniques like multi-task learning can also be
adopted in FL [Smith et al., 2017].
3.2 Autonomy
The organizations are often autonomous and under indepen-
dent control. These organizations are willing to share the
information with the others only if they retain control. It is
important to address the autonomy property when designing
an FLS.
Association autonomy
An organization can decide whether or not to associate or
disassociate itself from FL and can participate in one or more
FLSs. Ideally, an FLS should be robust enough to tolerate the
entry or departure of any organization. Thus, the FLS should
not fully depend on any single participant. Since this goal is
hard to achieve, in practice, the organizations can make an
agreement to regularize the entry or departure to ensure that
the FLS works properly.
Communication autonomy
An organization should have the ability to decide how much
information to communicate with others. The organization
can also choose the size of data to participate in the FL. An
FLS should have the ability to handle dynamic size of com-
munication during the learning process. As we mentioned in
Section 3.1, the benefit of the organization should be relevant
with its communication size. The organization may gain more
if it is willing to share more information, while the risk of
exposing user privacy may also be larger.
4 Taxonomy
Through analysis of many application scenarios in building
FLSs, we can classify FLSs by four dimensions: data distri-
bution, model, privacy level, and communication architecture.
These dimensions include some common factors (i.e., data
distribution and communication architecture) in previous fed-
erated systems and some unique consideration (i.e., model
and privacy level) for FLSs. Furthermore, these dimensions
can be used to direct the design of FLSs. Figure 2 shows the
summary of the taxonomy of FLSs.
Let’s explain the four dimensions with an intuitive example.
The hospitals in different regions want to conduct federated
learning to improve the performance of prediction task on lung
cancer. Then, four dimensions have to be considered to design
such a federated learning system. First, we should consider
how the patient records are distributed among hospitals. Since
patients tend to go to nearby hospitals, the patient records
in different hospitals may differ a lot and we can utilize it.
Second, we should figure out which machine learning model
should be adopted for such a task. For example, we may adopt
gradient boosting trees which show a good performance on
many classification problems. Third, we have to decide what
techniques to use for privacy protection. The patient records
should be strictly protected. Differential privacy is an option
Federated learning 
systems
Data partition Model Privacy level Communication architecture
DecentralizedCentralized
Complete zero 
knowledge
Differential 
privacy
Raw data 
protection
Horizontal Vertical
Statistical 
methods
Decision 
trees
Neural 
networks
Figure 2: Taxonomy of FLSs
to achieve the security guarantee. Last, the communication
architecture also matters. We may need a centralized server
to control the updates of the model. Next, we discuss these
dimensions in details.
4.1 Data Distribution
Based on how data are distributed over the sample and feature
spaces, FLSs can be typically categorized to horizontal FLSs
and vertical FLSs [Yang et al., 2019].
In horizontal FL, the datasets of different organizations have
the same feature space but little intersection on the sample
space. Participants usually compute and send local gradients
to train a global model. Techniques such as homomorphic
encryption [Aono et al., 2018] and secret sharing [Bonawitz
et al., 2017] are used to process the gradients to protect user
privacy. Google proposed a horizontal FLS which can suc-
cessfully work on millions of phones [Bonawitz et al., 2019].
The system uses a server to aggregate the information from
the devices and adopts differential privacy [McMahan et al.,
2017] and secure aggregation to enhance privacy guarantee.
In vertical FL, the datasets of different organizations have
the same sample space but differ in the feature space. The
vertical FLSs usually adopt entity alignment techniques to
collect the overlapped samples of the organizations. Then the
overlapped data are used to train the machine learning model
using encryption methods. Cheng et al. [2019] proposed a loss-
less vertical FLS to enable participants to collaboratively train
gradient boosting decision trees. They use privacy-preserving
entity alignment to find common users among two parties,
whose gradients are used to jointly train the decision trees.
Yang et al. [2019] addressed a special scenario where the
datasets of different organizations differ not only in the sam-
ple but also in the feature space. Transfer learning [Pan and
Yang, 2010] can be adopted to address such scenarios. Liu et
al. [2018] proposed a secure federated transfer learning system
which can be effectively adapted to various machine learning
tasks. Besides transfer learning, they also adopted additively
homomorphic encryption to protect privacy.
In reality, while existing FLSs mostly focus on one kind of
partition, the partition of data among the participants may be
a hybrid of horizontal partition and vertical partition.
4.2 Model
There are a large number of machine learning models. Most
FLSs are particularly designed for a specific machine learning
model. There are three different kinds of models that the
mainstream FLSs have supported: statistical methods, decision
trees, and neural networks.
Statistical methods include some basic machine learning
models such as linear regression and logistic regression [Chen
et al., 2018]. These models are commonly used and easy
to learn. There are many well developed systems for linear
regression and logistic regression [Nikolaenko et al., 2013;
Hardy et al., 2017]. Due to the variety of statistical methods,
there are still many widely used machine learning models like
K-Means that need to be further investigated with FL.
A tree based FLS is designed for the training for a single or
multiple decision trees (i.e., gradient boosting decision trees
and random forests). GBDTs are especially popular recently
and it has a very good performance in many classification and
regression tasks. Zhao et al. [2018] and Cheng et al. [2019]
proposed FLSs for GBDTs on horizontal and vertical data,
respectively.
A neural network based system aims to train neural net-
works, which are an extremely hot topic in current ma-
chine learning area. There are many works on a sim-
ple deep neural network recently [Bonawitz et al., 2019;
Yang et al., 2019], but little work on some state-of-the-art
architectures such as convolutional neural network and recur-
rent neural network.
Generally, for different machine learning models, the de-
signs of the FLSs always differ. It is still challenging to pro-
pose a practical tree based or neural network based FLS. More-
over, due to the fast developing of machine learning, there is a
gap for FLSs to support the state-of-the-art models.
4.3 Privacy Level
There are different privacy restrictions among the FLSs. We
can divide the privacy restrictions to three different levels:
complete zero knowledge, differential privacy, and raw data
protection.
For a complete zero knowledge restriction, all participants
cannot learn anything except the output. This restriction is
very strict and secure multi-party computation [Lindell, 2005]
is usually adopted in such systems. Secure multi-party compu-
tation can be enabled with cryptographic techniques [Bonawitz
et al., 2017] (e.g., secure aggregation, homomorphic encryp-
tion) and systems based on trusted processors such as Intel
SGX [Ohrimenko et al., 2016]. Although such systems can
protect user privacy well, it is always not efficient and has a
large computation and communication overhead.
Many systems adopt differential privacy [Zhao et al., 2018]
for data privacy protection, where the participants cannot know
whether an individual record participates in the learning. By
adding random noise to the data or the model parameters,
differential privacy provides statistical privacy for individual
records and protection against the inference attack on the
model. Due to the noises in the learning process, such systems
tend to produce less accurate models.
The most basic requirement is that the raw data are not
exposed. The organizations cannot derive the individual record
of the other participants. Such restriction is more practical
compared with complete zero knowledge security [Du et al.,
2004; Liu et al., 2018]. However, the user privacy may not
be well protected and some aggregate information may be
inferred by the other participants.
Most of existing FLSs adopt cryptographic techniques or
differential privacy to achieve privacy guarantees. However,
the limitations of these approaches seem hard to overcome.
While trying to minimize the side effects brought by these
methods, it may also be a good choice to look for novel ap-
proaches to protect data privacy.
Related to privacy level, the threat models also vary in
FLSs. A common assumption is that all parties are honest-but-
curious [Yang et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018], meaning that
they follow the protocol but try to find out as much as possible
about the data of the other parties. Some robust systems also
allow malicious parties [Hitaj et al., 2017], where the parties
may cheat the system by faking its input. It is important for
FLSs to defense malicious attacks.
4.4 Communication Architecture
There are two major ways of communications in FLSs: cen-
tralized design and decentralized design. Figure 3 shows the
examples of centralized and decentralized designs. In the cen-
tralized design, one server or a specific participant is required
to aggregate the information (e.g., gradients) from the other
participants [Bonawitz et al., 2019]. The parameter updates
on the global model are always done in this server. In a de-
centralized design, the communications are done between the
participants [Zhao et al., 2018] and every participant is able to
update the global parameters directly.
While the centralized design is widely used in existing FLSs,
the decentralized design should be preferred since concentrat-
ing information on one server may bring potential risks or
unfairness. Blockchain [Zheng et al., 2018] is a popular de-
centralized platform for consideration. It is still challenging to
design a decentralized system for FL while each participant is
treated nearly equally in terms of communication during the
learning process.
server
client client client client
(a) Centralized design
client client client client
(b) Decentralized design
Figure 3: Different ways of communication
5 Summary and Vision
In this section, we compare the existing FLSs according to
the dimensions considered in Section 4 and present interesting
future research directions.
5.1 Comparison
Table 1 shows a summary of comparison between some repre-
sentative FLSs. From Table 1, we have the following findings.
First, current systems only implemented one kind of partition
methods and one kind of machine learning models. A general
and complete FLS which can support multiple kinds of data
partition or machine learning models is still on the way. Sec-
ond, homomorphic encryption seems to be the most popular
technique to be used to protect privacy. However, there is
no final conclusion as to which approach is better. It should
depend on the privacy restrictions. Last, many systems still
adopt a centralized communication design since they need a
server to aggregate model parameters or gradients. Now we
give more details on these FLSs.
Google proposed a scalable FLS which enables over tens of
millions of Android devices learning a deep neural network
based on TensorFlow [Bonawitz et al., 2019]. In their design,
they use a server to aggregate the model updates with federated
averaging [McMahan et al., 2017], which are computed by the
devices locally in synchronous rounds. Differential privacy
and secure aggregation are used to enhance privacy guarantees.
Cheng et al. [2019] implemented a vertical tree-based FLS
called SecureBoost. In their assumptions, only one partici-
pant has the label information. They use the entity alignment
technique to get the common data and then build the decision
trees. Additively homomorphic encryption is used to protect
the gradients.
Table 1: Comparison among some latest FLSs.
Federated learning
systems
horizontal data
partition
vertical data
partition
neural network
implementation
decision tree
implementation
linear regression
implementation
secure/model
aggregation
differential
privacy
homomorphic
encryption
communication
design
Google FLS
[Bonawitz et al., 2019] 3 7 3 7 7 3 3 7 centralized
SecureBoost
[Cheng et al., 2019] 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 3 centralized
Tree-based FL
[Zhao et al., 2018] 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 decentralized
Federated Transfer Learning
[Liu et al., 2018] 7 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 centralized
Ridge Regression FL
[Chen et al., 2018] 3 7 7 7 3 3 7 3 centralized
Bayesian Nonparametric FL
[Yurochkin et al., 2019] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 centralized
Federated Multi-Task Learning
[Smith et al., 2017] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 centralized
Zhao et al. [2018] proposed a horizontal tree-based FLS.
Each decision tree is trained locally without the communica-
tions between participants. The trees trained in a participant
are sent to the next participant to continuous train a number of
trees. Differential privacy is used to protect the decision trees.
Liu et al. [2018] introduced an FL framework combined
with transfer learning for neural networks. They address a spe-
cific scenario where two participants have a part of common
samples and all the label information are in one participant.
They use additively homomorphic encryption to encrypt the
model parameters to protect data privacy.
Chen et al. [2013] proposed a system for privacy-preserving
ridge regression. Their approaches combine both homomor-
phic encryption and secure summation to achieve privacy re-
quirements. An extra evaluator is needed to run the algorithm.
Yurochkin et al. [2019] developed a probabilistic FL frame-
work by applying Bayesian nonparametric machinery. They
use an Beta-Bernoulli process informed matching procedure
to combine the local models into a federated global model.
Smith et al. [2017] combined federated learning with multi-
task learning (MTL) [Zhang and Yang, 2017]. Their method
consider the issues of high communication cost, stragglers,
and fault tolerance for MTL in the federated environment.
5.2 Future Research Directions
Dynamic scheduling
As we discussed in Section 3.2, the number of participants
may not be fixed during the learning process. However, the
number of participants is fixed in many existing systems and
they do not consider the situations where there are entries
of new participants or departures of the current participants.
The system should support dynamic scheduling and have the
ability to adjust its strategy when there is a change in the
number of participants. There are some studies addressing this
issue. For example, Google’s FLS [Bonawitz et al., 2019] can
tolerate the drop-outs of the devices. Also, the emergence of
blockchain [Zheng et al., 2018] can be an ideal and transparent
platform for multi-party learning. More efforts need to be
down in this direction.
Diverse privacy restrictions
Little work has considered the privacy heterogeneity of FLSs,
as shown in Section 3.1. The existing systems adopt tech-
niques to protect the model parameters or gradients for all
the participants on the same level. However, the privacy re-
strictions of the participants usually differ in reality. It would
be interesting to design an FLS which treats the participants
differently according to their privacy restrictions. The learned
model should have a better performance if we can maximize
the utilization of data of each party while not violating their
respective privacy restrictions. The heterogeneous differential
privacy [Alaggan et al., 2015] may be useful in such setting.
Intelligent benefits
Intuitively, one participant can gain more from the FLS if it
contributes more information. A simple solution is to make
agreements between the participants such that some partic-
ipants pay for the other participants which contribute more
information. Representative incentive mechanisms need to be
developed.
Benchmark
As more FLSs are being developed, a benchmark with repre-
sentative data sets and workloads is quite important to evaluate
the existing systems and direct future development. Caldas et
al. [2018] proposed LEAF, which is a benchmark including
federated datasets, a evaluation framework, and reference im-
plementations. Still, more applications and scenarios are the
key for the success of FLSs.
System architecture
Like the parameter server in deep learning which controls the
parameter synchronization, some common system architec-
tures are needed to be investigated for FL. Although Yang
et al. [2019] proposed three architectures for different parti-
tion methods of data, we need more complete architectures in
terms of learning models or privacy levels.
6 Conclusion
Many efforts have been devoted to developing federated learn-
ing systems (FLSs). A complete overview and summary for
existing FLSs is important and meaningful. Inspired by the
previous federated systems, we show that heterogeneity and
autonomy are two important factors in the design of practical
FLSs. Moreover, with four different dimensions, we provide
a complete categorization for FLSs. Based on these dimen-
sions, we also present the comparison on features and designs
among existing FLSs. More importantly, we have pointed out
a number of opportunities, ranging from more benchmarks to
integration of emerging platforms such as blockchain.
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